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It appears that the manufacturer of inherently dangerous products has a duty to protect the public from foreseeable injuries
due to the very nature of the product, the purposes for which the
product will be used or the necessity of additional safety devices
upon installation. This duty to warn, instruct or inspect is not
delegable to an intermediary party, but apparently the duty to
make one's product more safe by the installation of safety devices
is delegable through proper warnings and instructions to the
consumer.
PaulR. Rice
Torts--Discarding the Rule of Imputed Negligence in
Automobile Cases
P, while riding in an automobile driven by his servant within the
scope of employment, was injured when his automobile was struck
by another vehicle driven by D's servant. P's servant was contributorily negligent. D contended that the negligence of P's servant
should be imputed to P. Judgment in the lower court was in favor
of D. Held, reversed. The negligence of a servant involved in an
automobile accident in the scope of his employment should not be
imputed to his master, who was riding with him at the time, so as
to bar the master's right of recovery against a negligent third party.
Weber v. Stokley Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
This Minnesota decision represents a rejection of a widely, if
not universally, accepted principle that the negligence of a servant
will be imputed to his master in automobile cases when the master
would be vicariously liable.' The theory of imputed negligence is
said to have its origin 2 in an old English case3 in which the negligence of an omnibus driver was imputed to a passenger who was
struck and injured by another vehicle upon alighting from the
omnibus. The omnibus driver was negligent in permitting the
passenger to disembark in the middle of the street instead of at the
curb as was proper. In imputing his negligence to the passenger, the
court reasoned that the passenger was so identified with the driver
that she must be precluded from recovering against the negligent
driver of the other vehicle.
E.g., Hightower v. Landnim, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964);
Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 264, 40 S.E. 324 (1946).
2 Lessler, TnE PnoposwD DiscARD or r=n DocTwRNE oF IMWUTED CONTRIUroRY NEGLIGENCE, 20 Fordham L. Reo. 156 (1951).
3Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849).
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The identification theory of imputing negligence to passengers
was discarded in England some forty years after its inception,4
but it was applied in a few American jurisdictions until the early
part of the twentieth century.' From the identification theory,
however, evolved the principle of imputing negligence in certain
relationships when there would be vicarious liability. The great
majority of American courts have imputed negligence in automobile
cases involving the negligence of a servant who was acting in the
scope of his authority at the time the negligent act transpired.6
Some states, however, have imputed negligence to the owner of
an automobile despite the nonexistence of a master-servant relationship. Under the "family-car doctrine" courts have imputed negligence to the owner of a motor vehicle when the vehicle was being
used by a member of his household for their convenience or
pleasure." In other states the same effect has been accomplished
by enacting "automobile consent" statutes which create fictional
agency relationships between the owner and any person driving
the vehicle with his consent.' Liability under the "family car
doctrine" and the "consent" statutes is limited to the scope of
consent.9 Generally, however, negligence is not imputed in these
circumstances when it would preclude the owner's recovery against
negligent third parties."0
In the master-servant situation, however, the owner has been
precluded from recovery because of imputed negligence. Denial
of recovery has been based on the "both ways" test which imputes
negligence to bar a master's recovery as well as to render him liable
§ 73 (3d ed. 1964).
5Both Massachussetts and Michigan adopted the "identification theory.
In Bessey v. Salemme, 302 Mass 188, 19 N.E.2d 75 (1939), the Massachussetts court rejected the rule but the Michigan courts continued to follow the
theory until it was finally discarded in 1946 in Brecker v. Green, 313 Mich.
218, 621 N.W.2d 105 (1946).
E.g. Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964);
Divita
7 v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 264, 40 S.E.2d 324 (1946).
King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 396 (1918); Allison v. Bartlett, 121 Wash. 418, 209 Pac. 863 (1922).
89 CAL. Vr.mcr= CoDE § 17150; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 31-31-3 (1956).
Psota v. Long Island R.R. Co., 246.N.Y. 388, 159 N.E. 180 (1927)
(automobile consent statute); La~len, Vicarious Liability and the Family Auto,
26 Mirc. L. Rev. 846 (1928).
10 Mason v. Russell, 158 Cal. App. 2d 324, 322 P.2d 486 (1958); Brown v.
Rowland, 40 Cal. App. 2d 825, 104 P.2d 138 (1940). Contra, Davis Pontiac
Co. v. Sirois. 82 R.I. 32, 105 A.2d 792 (1954).
4 PRossun, ToRTs
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to third parties who were injured as a result of the negligent acts
of the servant." The Restatement of Torts (Second) adopts the both
ways test of imputing negligence in master-servant situations. 2
However, it should be noted that the test has been rejected in the
Restatement of Torts (Second) with regard to other types of relationships.'"
The "both ways" test has been the subject of much criticism because it seeks to punish a faultless owner for the negligence of his
servant and thus permits a negligent third party to escape liability.
Since the justification for the imputed negligence rule has been
in part the desire to provide a solvent defendant,' 4 it would seem
that the criticism has some merit. When the master seeks recovery,
the deep pocket argument is illogical and inapplicable since the
solvency of the master is not a problem. The inapplicability of
such an argument in this situation is only magnified in states having
a Financial Responsibility Act,'3 the sole purpose of which is to
impress financial liability upon an owner of a vehicle for the negligent acts of one who drives the vehicle with his consent.
The theory of imputed negligence has also been predicated upon
the idea that since the master has the right to control the acts of
his servant he should be barred from recovery.'6 In pointing out
the absurdity of this argument, a New York court stated that not
only would it be dangerous for a master to take control of the
wheel while traveling on the high speed highways of today, the
act in itself could be deemed negligence.'7
In proposing the rejection of the imputed negligence principle,
one author stated that it is
unreasonable and illogical to hold that, although a servant is
personally liable to a master for negligence while operating a
" Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964);
Read v. City & Suburban B.R. Co 115 Ga. 366 41 S.E. 629 (1947).
2 RESTATEMNT (SECOND), TORTs §486 (Y966).
3
'4 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 485 (1960).
, Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 20 FoiwnAnnm L. REv. 156 (1951).
'5 See generally, Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn.
394, 10
N.W.2d 406 (1943).
6
Mammelli v. Dufrene 169 So. 2d 242 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
17 jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278

(1941).
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car for his master, the very same negligence must be imputed
in an action against a third party.' 8
This author suggests that the rights and liabilities of a master should
be no more nor less than if he were merely a passenger.' 9
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, has
adhered to the majority rule despite its shortcomings. In Divita v.
Atlantic Trucking Co.,20 the court stated that since it was undis-

puted that the servant was acting for and in behalf of the master
plaintiff at the time of the accident, any contributory acts of the
servant were imputable to the master-plaintiff.
Although the decision of the Minnesota court rejecting such a rule
was limited to automobile cases in which the plaintiff was the
master, the decision may be indicative of a future trend in discarding the general theory of imputed negligence. However, as
was indicated in the court's opinion, they may continue to be a
minority of one.
William Douglass Goodwin

Trusts-Power of Revocation-Various Methods
Decedent prior to death executed two written trust agreements on
bank accounts whereby the decedent was named trustee of the
separate accounts and certain beneficiaries were designated. The
trusts were, by express terms, declared to be revocable. Subsequently, decedent executed a will in which she specifically bequeathed
the bank accounts to persons other than the beneficiaries under
the trust agreements. The lower court held that the two bank
accounts were revocable declarations of trust, not tentative or Totten
trusts, and that the will did not revoke such trusts. HELD, affirmed.
Where a depositor sets up bank accounts in his own name as
trustee by means of written agreements specifically stated to be
revocable, such trusts are absolute inter vivos trusts, not Totten
trusts, and unless the power to revoke by will is specifically
1 Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence 20 FonDH L. REv. 156 (1951).
22 Ibid.
°Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co. 129 W. Va. 284, 40 S.E. 324 (1946).
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